Since the ‘Holocaust’ has long been exposed has a historical nonsense in nationalist circles there has been an increasing tendency to try and find something to use to try and claim that National Socialism was/is evil/bad and the most common two – and somewhat related things – is the Third Reich’s treatment of Poles and then – separately but linked – treatment (or projected treatment) of Slavs in general.
The cornerstone of both of these claims is what historians refer to as ‘Generalplan Ost’ which was a real policy document but which we don’t in fact have and what is claimed as ‘Generalplan Ost’ is in fact a post-war reconstruction that began to be created in the 1950s and 1960s following the discovery of Erhard Wetzel’s memorandum on the subject in 1957 and which is claimed to create an intellectual framework of ‘genocidal anti-Slavic racial supremacy’ that the alleged atrocities against Poles and Slavs that the Third Reich is claimed to have engaged in from 1939 to 1944/45 in Eastern Europe are placed in.
This narrative claims that the Third Reich was planning to ‘exterminate’/’wipe out’ all – or at least large numbers – Poles and Slavs in general in the East and as such it is claimed that ‘Hitler/National Socialism was/is anti-White/anti-European’ but in truth this is typical ill-thought out hogwash that is believed not because of the evidence but because it serves a propagandistic purpose.
Now it is worth noting that bulk of what we know about ‘Generalplan Ost’ comes from Wetzel’s memorandums of 7th February 1942 and 27th April 1942 and when we read these as a whole together – rather than just out-of-context snippets – it becomes very clear that those who claim ‘Generalplan Ost’ was some kind of homicidal ‘extermination’ operation are not only being unintentionally dishonest but are actively lying.
This is part of a series of original German sources that will be translated into English to allow readers to easily address and correct the anti-German libel that is the conventional ‘interpretation’ of ‘Generalplan Ost’ as being a kind of ‘Slavic Holocaust’, because – as is often the case – the sources speak for themselves. The source we will reproduce in English translation here is Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler’s letter to Ulrich Greifelt of 14th June 1942 about the details of ‘Generalplan Ost’ which once again clearly shows the non-genocidal nature of the plan.
My analysis of these all documents will be published separately possibly in monograph or book form. My comments will be in the form of numbered notes and in-line commentary using square brackets.
Personal Staff Reichsführer-SS Records
The Reichsführer-SS Administration File No. Secret/90 38
File No. AR/33/11/42 RF/V. Führer Headquarters
June 12, 1942
Re: Generalplan Ost — Legal, economic and geographic foundations of the reconstruction of the East
Dear Greifelt! (1)
I have reviewed the Generalplan Ost [proposals], which I find quite appealing overall. I would like to present this plan to the Fuhrer at some point. However, this requires us to create a comprehensive settlement plan that incorporates the earlier plans for Danzig-West Prussia, the Warthegau and Upper Silesia, Southeast Prussia, and, in broad outline, also for Bohemia and Moravia, (2) as well as, incidentally, Alsace-Lorraine, Upper Carniola, (3) and Southern Styria. (4) All of this would need to be summarized in a single plan, including maps and overall calculations.
I believe I’ve been misunderstood on one point. This twenty-year plan (5) must include the complete Germanization of Estonia and Latvia, as well as the entire General Government. (6) We must achieve this within the next twenty years, if possible. I personally am convinced that it is achievable. (7)
The current proposal to only seed the General Government and the entire Eastern territory with outposts [Stützpunkten] does not correspond to my thoughts and wishes. (8) The situation in Lithuania is more difficult. Here, we can expect less from the Germanization of the existing population. Rather, we must consider the complete settlement [of Lithuania]. That, too, must be achieved. (9)
Before the overall plan is [formally] presented to me as Generalplan Ost, I request that a draft [of the plan] be sent to me for review, clearly outlining the total requirements in terms of settlers, workers, funds, etc., and furthermore, specifying the needs in each of the four five-year plans. (10) Only then – if something is truly impossible – would we need to agree which items can be cut [or postponed/modified].
Heil Hitler!
Ihr
HH (Heinrich Himmler)
References
(1) Ulrich Greifelt; SS-Gruppenfuhrer (Major General) and an economist by training and profession who was Himmler’s Chief of Staff at the ‘Office of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of German Nationhood’ (RKFDV) from October 1939.
(2) The territory of rump Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement of 30th September 1938 broadly speaking, which had become the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939.
(3) North-western Slovenia which borders southern Austria.
(4) North-eastern Slovenia which borders southern Austria.
(5) Himmler is here insisting on a substantially shortened timeline for the Germanization of the East proposed by Erhard Wetzel in his 27th April 1942 memorandum on ‘Generalplan Ost’ which was thirty years. Whether this was realistic or not is another matter – Himmler implies he is not sure if this realistic or not (‘Only then, if something is truly impossible, would we need to agree which items can be cut.’) – but the policies advocated by Wetzel and others (for example in Wetzel’s 7th February 1942 letter to Otto Brautigam) remain untouched by Himmler and further on Himmler alludes to the fact that no ‘genocide of the Slavs’ is intended but rather sees that a policy of mass Germanization is the way to achieve his vision of a Germanized East.
(6) What Himmler means here is made clear by quoting Wetzel’s 7th February 1942 to Bautigam, which explains that: ‘Party comrade Girgensohn from the Reich Security Main Office then elaborated at length; stating that while a forced evacuation of the undesirable population in the Baltic states was extremely problematic and therefore unacceptable [as] even during the Tsarist era, Estonians, Latvians, and others had shown a tendency to emigrate voluntarily to the Russian territories if offered secure employment. He was convinced that much could still be achieved today through such voluntary resettlement. Experience has shown that it is impossible to establish an administration of the territories using Russian forces alone. Therefore – especially since German forces are in no way sufficient – it is necessary to work with the help of foreign nations. (He therefore considered it highly appropriate to integrate the racially undesirable members of the Baltic peoples into this society as a middle class. Those concerned would have to be well paid for their circumstances. Russification was hardly to be expected. B. K. Schulz then explained that he, too, had developed serious reservations about the forced evacuation from these countries to Siberia. One should try to achieve voluntary resettlement.’ Meaning that the Germans were looking to Germanize as many racially suitable people in the Baltic States (and the East in general) as possible and then gradually voluntarily re-settle as many racially unsuitable people further to the East (in and around Moscow and the Urals) as possible not engage in massive, forced deportations over the course of a few months and years. Himmler’s reference to the ‘General Government’ refers to rump Poland that had been administratively split off from the rest of the former state of Poland which was considered (or was) pre-Treaty of Versailles German territory in late 1939/early 1940; Wetzel’s 27th April 1942 memorandum explicitly states that as many Poles as possible are to be Germanized and those who aren’t suitable deported/re-settled in a kind of ‘new Poland’ in Western Siberia. On the timeline see note 5.
(7) This is clearly a reference to what Wetzel is discussing in his 27th April 1942 memorandum in regard to the timeline required by thirty years with Himmler pushing for twenty years but yet Himmler is also clearly unsure if this timeline is actually achievable or not: ‘I personally am convinced that it is achievable.’
(8) Himmler’s use of ‘Stützpunkten’ here literally translates as ‘bases’ but Himmler probably means Germanic settlements/outposts. Himmler appears to be pushing for a more complete settlement and Germanization of the East than is being envisioned in the version of ‘Generalplan Ost’ that he is reviewing but it is unclear what exactly he means by this.
(9) Lithuania was unusual during the Second World War in that on 23rd June 1941; the Lithuanians engaged in mass uprising against the Soviet occupiers in support of their German liberators, but the Provisional Lithuanian government and its nascent armed forces (the Tautinio darbo apsaugos Battalion [usually referred to as the TDA Battalion]) wanted far more autonomy/independence than the Germans were willing to grant so a compromise was reached whereby Lithuania came under the authority of the German governmental entity called ‘Generalbezirk Litauen’ run by the Baltic German economist and lawyer Theodor Adrian von Renteln which was part of ‘Reichskommissariat Ostland’. However, while the Germans were in overall charge; ‘Generalbezirk Litauen’ was staffed and run largely by Lithuanians who resisted too much involvement in the German war effort or actively providing recruits to the Waffen-SS till early-mid 1944 when a deal around future Lithuanian independence had been agreed. Himmler is writing around a year into this diplomatic wrangling between the Germans and Lithuanians; thus, we can see why Himmler believes that Lithuanians will largely resist voluntary Germanization and instead choose voluntarily re-settlement further in the East. Hence Himmler’s comments about the likely necessity of the near complete re-settlement of Lithuania, but it is evident (and necessarily implied by him) that racially suitable Lithuanians may still possibly choose Germanization en bloc rather than re-settlement in a ‘new Lithuania’ further to the East.
(10) It is unclear what Himmler means by the ‘four five-year plans’ (‘der vier Fünfjahrespläne’) since Germany was still operating (officially anyway) in 1942 under the ‘Four Year Plan’ (‘Vierjahresplan’) headed by Hermann Goering from August 1936 (you can see this in the attendees list from the Wannsee Conference on 20th January 1942 where SS-Oberfuhrer Erich Neumann represented the interests of the German economy as a representative of the ‘Office of the Four Year Plan’), but presumably these reflect four five year economic scenarios/options Himmler was considering as future proposals to Hitler in the form of post-war planning for the Third Reich’s economy and the role that ‘Generalplan Ost’ would play in it.
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